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This paper proposes a simple homogeneous dynamic model of investment and corporate risk management
for a financially constrained firm. Following Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), we define a corporation’s
risk management as the coordination of investment and financing decisions. In our model, corporate
risk management involves internal liquidity management, financial hedging, and investment. We determine
a firm’s optimal cash, investment, asset sales, credit line, external equity finance, and payout policies
as functions of the following key parameters: 1) the firm’s earnings growth and cash-flow risk; 2)
the external cost of financing; 3) the firm’s liquidation value; 4) the opportunity cost of holding cash;
5) investment adjustment and asset sales costs; and 6) the return and covariance characteristics of hedging
assets the firm can invest in. The optimal cash inventory policy takes the form of a double-barrier
policy where i) cash is paid out to shareholders only when the cash-capital ratio hits an endogenous
upper barrier, and ii) external funds are raised only when the firm has depleted its cash. In between
the two barriers, the firm adjusts its capital expenditures, asset sales, and hedging policies. Several
new insights emerge from our analysis. For example, we find an inverse relation between marginal
Tobin’s q and investment when the firm draws on its credit line. We also find that financially constrained
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In the presence of external ﬁnancing costs, corporate investment, risk management, and ﬁnancing
decisions are closely intertwined. Corporations can create value by managing their cash holdings
and by hedging their underlying earnings risk (see e.g. Smith and Stulz (1985) and Graham and
Smith (1999)). As Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998)
have emphasized, corporate risk management can reduce ﬁrms’ costs of ﬁnancing investments by
transferring internal funds and structuring external ﬁnancing so that enough cash is available in the
states of nature where investment is most valuable. While this general principle and characterization
of the main role of corporate risk management is increasingly well understood, how to translate this
prescription into day-to-day risk management policies still remains largely undetermined. Simple
questions such as when/how corporations should reduce their cash holdings, or when/how they
should replenish their dwindling cash inventory are still not precisely understood. Similarly, the
questions of which risks the corporation should hedge and by how much, or whether the ﬁrm
should undertake an enterprise-wide risk management approach or a piecemeal approach of hedging
individual risks, are not well understood.
Our goal is to propose the ﬁrst elements of a tractable dynamic economic framework, in which
optimal corporate investment, asset sales, cash inventory, and risk management policies are easily
and precisely characterized. The key building block of our model is the neoclassical q theory
of investment, which features a constant returns to scale (AK) production technology, convex
adjustment costs (´ a la Hayashi (1982)), and earnings shocks that are independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.).
We add to this model a deadweight external ﬁnancing cost plus an opportunity cost of hoarding
cash, and proceed to derive the ﬁrm’s optimal cash-inventory, external ﬁnancing, payout, investment
and hedging policies as functions of the ﬁrm’s underlying risk-return characteristics, investment ad-
justment technology, and the diﬀerent ﬁnancing costs it faces. Although we make the somewhat
1strong assumption that productivity shocks are i.i.d., both investment and cash holdings are nev-
ertheless highly persistent due to the ﬁrm’s constrained optimal investment decisions in response
to these shocks.
Importantly, with external ﬁnancial costs, the ﬁrm’s investment is no longer determined by
equating the marginal cost of investing with marginal q as in the neoclassical model under Modigliani-
Miller neutrality (even in the absence of ﬁxed costs of investing).1 Instead, corporate investment
is determined by the following modiﬁed investment Euler equation:
marginal cost of investing =
marginal q
marginal cost of ﬁnancing
.
In other words, the investment Euler equation for a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm links investment
to the ratio of marginal q to the marginal cost of ﬁnancing. When ﬁrms are ﬂush with cash, the
marginal cost of ﬁnancing is approximately one, so that this Euler equation is then approximately
the same as the classical Euler equation. But when ﬁrms have low cash holdings or are close to
ﬁnancial distress, the marginal cost of ﬁnancing may be much larger than one and can substan-
tially modify the classical investment Euler equation. More interestingly, when credit line is the
ﬁrm’s marginal source of ﬁnancing, marginal q increases with the ﬁrm’s leverage, while investment
decreases with its leverage. That is, marginal q and investment move in opposite directions.
The logic behind this result is the following. First, an increase in investment helps relax the
ﬁrm’s future borrowing constraint by adding capital that may be pledged as collateral. This explains
why marginal q increases with its leverage. Second, the more debt (through credit line) the ﬁrm
has, the more it wants to move away from the external ﬁnancing region by engaging in aggressive
asset sales. The two eﬀects explain why we may simultaneously observe an increasing marginal
q schedule and a decreasing investment schedule as the ﬁrm uses more credit (i.e., takes on more
1See Abel and Eberly (1994) for a general speciﬁcation of the q theory of investment under the neoclassic setting
with both ﬁxed and variable costs. Their analysis builds on the classical theory of investment of Jorgensen (1963),
Lucas and Prescott (1971), and Hayashi (1982). Irreversible ﬁxed costs of investment in particular give rise to
‘inaction’ regions and generate real options for the ﬁrm as in McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). We do not consider ﬁxed costs of investing in this paper. The standard investment Euler equation may not
hold in the presence of ﬁxed costs. See Caballero and Leahy (1996).
2leverage).
Another novel economic insight emerging from our analysis concerns the behavior of a ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrm’s equity beta in terms of its cash holdings. One would expect equity beta to be
higher for a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm, as it reﬂects the ﬁrm’s exposure to both idiosyncratic
and systematic risk, whereas the equity beta of an unconstrained (ﬁrst-best) ﬁrm reﬂects only the
ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risk. This intuition is broadly valid in a static setting. However, in
a dynamic setting where ﬁrms actively manage their cash holdings, a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm
can have a lower equity beta than an unconstrained ﬁrm. The reason is that such a ﬁrm is likely
to hold a signiﬁcant proportion of its assets in cash, which has a zero beta, while an unconstrained
ﬁrm does not hold any cash. In addition, our model shows that returns on real investments depend
on the ﬁnancing constraints. Our model thus provides guidance on how to extend the neoclassical
production based asset pricing framework (see Cochrane (1991)) and how to conduct asset pricing
tests using investment returns of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
Much of the empirical literature on ﬁrms’ cash holdings tries to identify a target cash-inventory
for a ﬁrm by weighing the costs and beneﬁts of holding cash. 2 The implicit idea in this literature is
that this target level helps determine when a ﬁrm should increase its cash savings and when it should
dissave.3 Our analysis, however, suggests that the notion of a target cash level, or target cash-
capital ratio, is too narrow. Instead, a ﬁrm’s optimal cash inventory policy is better described by a
double-barrier policy similar to the Baumol-Tobin theory of an individual household’s transactions
demand for money (Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956)) and Miller and Orr (1966) theory of ﬁrms’
demand for money. When the cash-capital ratio hits an endogenous upper barrier, it is optimal for
the ﬁrm to pay out cash. When the ﬁrm runs out of cash, it either closes down or raises outside
funds, depending on whether the liquidation value exceeds the continuation value. The ﬁrm never
2See Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004, 2008), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Khurana, Martin, and Pereira
(2006), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).
3Recent empirical studies have found that corporations tend to hold more cash when their underlying earnings
risk is higher or when they have higher growth opportunities (see e.g. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)
and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2008)).
3issues external equity before depleting its cash reserve. By deferring issuance it postpones incurring
external ﬁnancing costs, yet it can still ﬁnance its desired level of investment via internal funds.
Thus, our model generates a simple dynamic pecking order of ﬁnancing where ﬁrst internal funds
are used and external equity issues are a last resort source of funding. In between these two barriers
the ﬁrm does not sit still but continuously manages its cash reserves by adjusting its investment
policy and by dynamically hedging its earnings risk.
When cash holdings are higher, the ﬁrm invests more ceteris paribus, because the marginal value
of cash is smaller. When the ﬁrm is approaching the point where its cash reserves are depleted, it
optimally scales down its investment and may even engage in asset sales. This way the ﬁrm can
avoid or postpone raising costly external ﬁnancing.
In addition to these cash management instruments, the ﬁrm can also beneﬁt by hedging its
earnings risk and investing in ﬁnancial assets that are correlated with its underlying earnings
risk. The beneﬁt from such hedging is to reduce the volatility of the ﬁrm’s net earnings and
thus to reduce the need for the ﬁrm to hold costly cash inventory. Derivatives and cash thus play
complementary roles in risk management. Derivatives allow ﬁrms to exploit the covariation between
the ﬁrm’s earnings and derivative returns, while cash is a non-state-contingent risk management
tool. Derivatives (such as oil or currency futures) help reducing the ﬁrm’s systematic risk exposure,
while cash can also help smooth idiosyncratic risk. Finally, asset sales are also an important tool in
managing risk. However, as investment distortions can be very costly, the ﬁrm only actively resorts
to asset sales in times of distress when replenishing liquidity is very valuable.
Despite the potential technical complications from introducing external ﬁnancing costs in the
neoclassical dynamic model of investment, we are able to characterize the solution via an analyti-
cally tractable one-dimensional dynamic optimization problem where the key state variable is the
ﬁrm’s cash-capital ratio. We are also able to give concrete and detailed prescriptions for how a ﬁrm
should manage its cash reserves and choose its investment and payout policies, given its underlying
4production technology, investment opportunities, investment adjustment costs, ﬁnancing costs, and
market interest rates. In particular, we provide comparative statics results for our baseline model
and show that when expected proﬁtability is low or when the costs of external ﬁnancing are high,
the ﬁrm does not raise new external funds when it runs out of cash, but chooses to liquidate instead.
In contrast, for higher expected proﬁtability or lower costs of external ﬁnancing, the ﬁrm prefers
raising new costly external funds. For each of these cases we show how the ﬁrm’s cash-inventory
and investment policies vary with earnings volatility and transaction costs.
Through simulations we can also compute the stationary distributions for the ﬁrm’s cash-capital,
investment-capital ratios, ﬁrm value-capital ratio as well as the marginal value of ﬁnancing. Re-
markably, we ﬁnd that under the stationary distribution, ﬁrms are most likely to hold suﬃcient
cash to be close to their payout boundary. As a result, average marginal cost of ﬁnancing is close
to unity, even for ﬁrms with large external ﬁnancing costs that result in substantial ﬁnancing con-
straints. However, ﬁrms respond to these constraints by optimally managing their cash holdings so
as to be able to stay away most of the time from ﬁnancial distress situations where they may need
to raise more external funds.
There is only a handful of theoretical analyses of ﬁrms’ optimal cash, investment and risk man-
agement policies. A key ﬁrst contribution is by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), who develop a
static model of a ﬁrm facing external ﬁnancing costs and risky investment opportunities. Another
more recent contribution by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2008) extends the Hart and Moore
(1994) theory of optimal cash holdings by introducing cash-ﬂow and investment uncertainty in a
three-period model. The contributions most closely related to ours are:
1. Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), who also consider dynamic models of investment for
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. The key diﬀerences with our setup are that they do not model
the ﬁrm’s cash accumulation process and they explore a model with decreasing returns to
scale, which is not as tractable as our constant returns to scale speciﬁcation. Moreover, they
5do not explore the interaction between corporate risk management and investment. Recently,
Gamba and Triantis (2008) have extended Hennessy and Whited (2007) to introduce issuance
costs of debt and thus explain why ﬁrms may simultaneously issue debt and hold cash.
2. Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007), who also characterize the investment Euler equation for
a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm at the payout and equity issuance boundaries. However, they do
not integrate the ﬁrm’s cash and risk management policies with its investment and ﬁnancing
policies.
3. Riddick and Whited (2008), who explore a discrete-time model with decreasing returns to
scale, an AR(1) process in logs for earnings, and quadratic investment adjustment costs.
They also analyze the ﬁrm’s optimal cash inventory and investment policy when the ﬁrm faces
external costs of ﬁnancing. While their model is more ﬂexible than ours, we are able to exploit
the continuous-time and constant returns to scale structure to obtain a more operational
characterization of the ﬁrm’s optimal policy. We also characterize the ﬁrm’s dynamic hedging
policy and its use of credit lines.
4. Decamps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2006), who also explore a continuous-time model
of a ﬁrm facing external ﬁnancing costs. Unlike our set-up, their ﬁrm only has a single
inﬁnitely-lived project of ﬁxed size, so that they cannot consider the interaction of the ﬁrm’s
real and ﬁnancial policies. Our model also relates to DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang
(2008) which integrate dynamic agency with the q theory of investment (´ a la Hayashi (1982))
in a continuous-time dynamic optimal contracting framework. Dynamic agency conﬂicts
generate an endogenous ﬁnancial constraint and induce underinvestment and liquidation in
their model.
In contrast to the somewhat thin theoretical literature on corporate risk management, there is
a much larger empirical literature exploring the determinants of ﬁrms’ cash holdings. Much of that
6literature focuses on the link between weak corporate governance and ﬁrms’ excess cash inventories,
in particular Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) (see
Dittmar (2008) for a survey of this literature).
As always with corporate ﬁnancial decisions, an important determinant of ﬁrms’ cash inventory
policies is taxes. The eﬀect of corporate taxes on ﬁrms’ payout decisions is explored in Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2001) and Foley, Harzell, Titman, and Twite (2007). There is also a large body
of empirical research focusing on ﬁrms’ share repurchase decisions (see again Dittmar (2008) for a
survey of the literature on share repurchases that is most relevant to ﬁrms’ cash inventory policy).
Finally, corporate cash policy may also be driven by more strategic considerations, such as building
a war-chest to improve the ﬁrm’s competitive position in product markets (see Haushalter, Klasa,
and Maxwell (2007)) or to facilitate corporate acquisitions (see Harford (1999)).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up our baseline model. Section
3 proceeds with model solution and qualitative analysis. Section 4 continues with quantitative
analysis. Section 5 discusses our model’s implication for risks and returns. Section 6 deals with
ﬁnancial hedging and Section 7 extends the baseline model of Section 2 to incorporate credit line
ﬁnancing. Section 8 oﬀer concluding comments.
2 Model Setup
We begin by describing the ﬁrm’s physical production and investment technology and its objective
function. We then introduce the ﬁrm’s external ﬁnancing costs and its opportunity cost of holding
cash.
2.1 Production technology
The ﬁrm employs only capital as an input for production. The price of capital is normalized to
unity. We denote by K and I respectively the level of the capital stock and gross investment. As
7is standard in capital accumulation models, the ﬁrm’s capital stock K evolves according to:
dKt = (It − δKt)dt, t ≥ 0, (1)
where δ ≥ 0 is the rate of depreciation.
The ﬁrm’s operating revenue at time t is proportional to its capital stock Kt, and is given by
KtdAt, where dAt is the ﬁrm’s revenue or productivity shock over time increment dt. We assume
that the ﬁrm’s cumulative productivity after accounting for systematic risk4 evolves according to:
dAt =  dt + σdZt, t ≥ 0, (2)
where Z is a standard Brownian motion. The parameters   > 0 and σ > 0 are the mean and
volatility of the productivity shock dAt. Thus, the revenue shock dA is assumed to be independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.). This production speciﬁcation is often refereed to as the “AK”
technology in the macroeconomics literature.5
The ﬁrm’s incremental operating proﬁt dYt over time increment dt is then given by:
dYt = KtdAt − Itdt − G(It,Kt)dt, t ≥ 0, (3)
where I is the cost of the investment and G(I,K) is the additional adjustment cost that the ﬁrm
incurs in the investment process. Following the neoclassical investment literature (Hayashi (1982)),
we assume that the ﬁrm’s adjustment cost is homogeneous of degree one in I and K. In other
words, the adjustment cost takes the homogeneous form G(I,K) = g(i)K, where i is the ﬁrm’s
investment capital ratio (i = I/K), and g(i) is an increasing and convex function. Our analyses do





where the parameter θ measures the degree of the adjustment cost.
4We leave the details about the risk adjustment to the Appendix.
5Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) develop an equilibrium production economy with the “AK” technology. See
Jones and Manuelli (2005) for a recent survey in macro.
8Finally, we assume that the ﬁrm can liquidate its assets at any time. The liquidation value Lt
is proportional to the ﬁrm’s capital, Lt = lKt, where l > 0.
The homogeneity assumption embedded in the adjustment cost and the “AK” production tech-
nology allows us to deliver our key results in a parsimonious and analytically tractable way. Ad-
justment costs may not always be convex and the production technology may exhibit decreasing
returns to scale in practice, but these functional forms substantially complicate the formal analy-
sis of dynamic investment models and do not permit a closed-form characterization of investment
and ﬁnancing policies (see Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007)). As will become clear below, the
homogeneity of our model in K allows us to reduce the dynamics to a one-dimensional equation,
which is straightforward to solve. See Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2008) for empirical evidence in
support of Hayashi homogeneity settings.
2.2 Financing costs
Neoclassical investment models (´ a la Hayashi (1982)) assume that the ﬁrm faces frictionless capital
markets and that the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem holds. However, in reality, ﬁrms
face important ﬁnancing frictions due to incentive, information asymmetry, and transaction cost
reasons.6 Our model incorporates a number of ﬁnancing costs that ﬁrms face in practice and that
empirical research has identiﬁed, while retaining an analytically tractable setting. The ﬁrm may
choose to use external ﬁnancing at any point in time. We assume that the ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost
of issuing external equity φK, which for tractability we take to be proportional to ﬁrm size as
measured by the capital stock K. This form of ﬁxed costs assumption ensures that the ﬁrm does
not grow out of the ﬁxed costs. The ﬁrm also incurs a proportional issuance cost γ for each unit
of external funds it raises. That is, for each incremental dollar the ﬁrm raises, it pays γ > 0. Let
H denote the process for the ﬁrm’s cumulative external ﬁnancing and hence dHt the incremental
external ﬁnancing over time dt.
6See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977), and Myers and Majluf (1984), for example.
9Let W denote the process for the ﬁrm’s cash inventory. If the ﬁrm runs out of cash (Wt = 0),
it needs to either raise external funds to continue operating, or liquidate its assets at value lK.7
If the ﬁrm chooses to raise new external funds to continue operating, it must pay the ﬁnancing
costs speciﬁed above. The ﬁrm may prefer liquidation if the cost of ﬁnancing is too high relative
to the continuation value (when the ﬁrm is not productive, e.g.,   is low). Let τ denote the ﬁrm’s
(stochastic) liquidation time, then τ = ∞ means that the ﬁrm never chooses to liquidate.
The rate of return that the ﬁrm earns on its cash inventory is the risk-free rate r minus a spread
λ > 0 that reﬂects the fact that retaining cash within the ﬁrm is costly. The cost of carrying cash
may arise from an agency problem or from tax distortions. Cash retentions are tax disadvantaged
because the associated tax rates generally exceed those on interest income (Graham (2000)). Since
there is a cost of hoarding cash (λ > 0), the ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to distribute cash back to
shareholders when its cash inventory grows too large.8
Let U denote the ﬁrm’s cumulative non-decreasing payout process to shareholders, and dUt the
incremental payout over time dt. Distributing cash to shareholders may take the form of a special
dividend payment or a share repurchase.9 The beneﬁt of a payout is that shareholders can invest
at the risk-free rate r, which is higher than (r − λ) the net rate of return on cash within the ﬁrm.
However, paying out cash also reduces the ﬁrm’s cash balance, which potentially exposes the ﬁrm
to current and future under-investment and future external ﬁnancing costs.
Combining cash ﬂow from operations dYt given in (3), with the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing policy given by
the cumulative payout process U and the cumulative external ﬁnancing process H, the ﬁrm’s cash
7We extend this speciﬁcation in Section 7 by allowing the ﬁrm to draw on a credit line. In that speciﬁcation, the
ﬁrm issues equity or liquidate after it has drawn down its credit line.
8If λ = 0, the ﬁrm has no incentives to pay out cash since keeping cash inside the ﬁrm does not have any
disadvantages, but still has the beneﬁts of relaxing ﬁnancing constraints. We could also imagine that there are
settings under which λ ≤ 0. For example, if we think that the ﬁrm may have “better” investment opportunities than
investors do, we can think of λ as an excess return. We do not explore this case in this paper as we are interested in
a trade-oﬀ model for cash holdings.
9We cannot distinguish between a special dividend and a share repurchase as we exclude taxes. Note, however,
that a commitment to regular dividend payments is suboptimal in our model. We also exclude any ﬁxed or variable
payout costs so as not to overburden the model. These can be added to the analysis.
10inventory W then evolves according to:
dWt = dYt + (r − λ) Wtdt + dHt − dUt, (5)
where the second term is the interest income (net of the carry cost λ), the third term dHt is the
cash inﬂow from external ﬁnancing, and the last term dUt is the cash outﬂow to investors, so that
(dHt − dUt) is the net cash ﬂow from ﬁnancing. Note that this is a completely general ﬁnancial
accounting equation where dHt and dUt are endogenously determined by the ﬁrm.
Firm optimality The ﬁrm chooses its investment I, its cumulative payout policy U, its cumu-




e−rt (dUt − dHt) + e−rτ (lKτ + Wτ)
￿
. (6)
The expectation is taken under the risk-adjusted probability. The ﬁrst term is the discounted value
of payouts to shareholders and the second term is the discounted value upon liquidation. Note that
optimality may imply that the ﬁrm never liquidates. In that case, we simply have τ = ∞. We
impose the usual regularity conditions to ensure that the optimization problem is well posed. See
the appendix for details.
3 Model Solution
We ﬁrst describe the ﬁrm’s optimal investment policy and ﬁrm value under the neoclassical bench-
mark with no capital market frictions. We then characterize the ﬁrm’s optimal dynamic investment
and ﬁnancing decisions in the presence of external ﬁnancing and payout costs.
3.1 A neoclassical benchmark
In the absence of costly ﬁnancing, our model specializes to the neoclassical model of investment
with convex adjustment costs. To ensure that the ﬁrst-best investment policy is well deﬁned, we
11assume that the following parameter condition holds:
(r + δ)
2 − 2(  − (r + δ))/θ > 0.
Then, under perfect capital markets (when the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds), the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-
best investment policy is given by IFB = iFBK, where
iFB = r + δ −
q
(r + δ)
2 − 2(  − (r + δ))/θ. (7)
The value of the ﬁrm’s capital stock is qFBK, where qFB is Tobin’ s q given by:
qFB = 1 + θiFB. (8)
First, the volatility of the productivity shocks σ has no direct impact on the ﬁrm’s investment
decision and ﬁrm value (as seen from (7)). However, σ can have an indirect eﬀect on investment since
higher systematic volatility increases the cost of capital. More interestingly, even the idiosyncratic
component of volatility aﬀects investment and ﬁrm value due to its eﬀect via the ﬁnancing constraint
channel, as we will show.
Second, due to the homogeneity property in production (the “AK” production speciﬁcation
and the homogeneity of the adjustment cost function G(I,K) in I and K), marginal q is equal to
average (Tobin’s) q, as in Hayashi (1982).
Third, gross investment I is positive if and only if the expected productivity   is higher than
r + δ, so we shall assume that   > r + δ. Whenever investment is positive, Tobin’s q is greater
than unity and installed capital earns rents. Intuitively, when   > r + δ, the installed capital is
more valuable than newly purchased capital. As is standard in the literature, Tobin’s q, the ratio
between the value of installed capital and that of newly purchased capital, is greater than unity
due to the adjustment cost.
We analyze next the ﬁrm’s optimal investment and ﬁnancing decisions when it faces costly
external ﬁnancing.
123.2 Firm value P (K,W) and the optimal investment-capital ratio
It is optimal for the ﬁrm (facing external ﬁnancing costs) to hoard some cash to ﬁnance its in-
vestment and to lower its future ﬁnancing costs. There are two natural state variables for the
ﬁrm’s optimization problem: the ﬁrm’s capital stock K and the ﬁrm’s cash inventory W. Let
P (K,W) denote ﬁrm value. Then, using the standard principle of optimality, we obtain the fol-
lowing Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for P(K,W) in the interior region for W where
dHt = 0 and dUt = 0:
rP(K,W) = max
I




The ﬁrst term (the PK term) on the right side of (9) represents the marginal eﬀect of net
investment (I − δK) on ﬁrm value P(K,W). The second term (the PW term) represents the eﬀect
of the ﬁrm’s expected saving on ﬁrm value, and the last term (the PWW term) captures the eﬀects
of the volatility of cash holdings W on ﬁrm value.
The ﬁrm chooses investment I optimally to set the expected return of the ﬁrm equal to the
risk-free rate r. In the interior region, the ﬁrm ﬁnances its investment out of its cash inventory
only. The convexity of the physical adjustment cost implies that the investment decision in our
model admits an interior solution. The investment-capital ratio i = I/K then satisﬁes the following
ﬁrst-order condition:




With frictionless capital markets (the Modigliani-Miller world) the marginal value of cash is
PW = 1, so that the neoclassical investment formula obtains: PK(K,W) is the marginal q, which
at the optimum is equal to the marginal cost of adjusting the capital stock 1 + θi. With costly
external ﬁnancing, on the other hand, the investment Euler equation (10) captures both real and
ﬁnancial frictions. The marginal cost of adjusting physical capital (1 + θi) is now equal to the ratio
of marginal q, PK(K,W), to the marginal cost of ﬁnancing (or equivalently, the marginal value of
13cash), PW(K,W). Thus, the more costly the external ﬁnancing (the higher PW) the less the ﬁrm
invests, ceteris paribus.
A key simpliﬁcation in our setup is that the ﬁrm’s two-state optimization problem can be
reduced to a one-state problem by exploiting homogeneity. That is, we can write ﬁrm value as
P (K,W) = K · p(w), (11)
where w = W/K is the ﬁrm’s cash-capital ratio, and reduce the ﬁrm’s optimization problem to a
one-state problem in w. The dynamics of w can be written as:
dwt = ((r − λ)wt +   − i(w) − g(i(w))) dt + σdZt. (12)
Instead of solving for ﬁrm value P (K,W), we shall instead solve for the ﬁrm’s value-capital
ratio p(w). Note that marginal q is then PK (K,W) = p(w) − wp′ (w), the marginal value of cash
is PW (K,W) = p′ (w), and PWW = p′′ (w)/K. Substituting these terms into (9) we then obtain
the following ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE) for p(w):
rp(w) = (i(w) − δ)
￿
p(w) − wp′ (w)
￿











− w − 1
￿
. (14)
To completely characterize the solution for p(w), we must also determine the boundaries w at which
the ﬁrm raises new external funds (or closes down), how much to raise (the target cash-capital ratio
after issuance), and w at which the ﬁrm pays out cash to shareholders.
3.3 The impact of ﬁnancing costs
In this subsection, we characterize the ﬁrm’s optimal policy and value. Depending on the parameter
values, the ﬁrm prefers either liquidation or reﬁnancing by issuing new equity. Case I refers to the
setting where liquidation is optimal. In Case II, the cost of equity issuance is small enough that
the ﬁrm prefers to reﬁnance than to liquidate when it runs out of cash.
14Case I: Optimal Liquidation. Recall that Tobin’s q under the frictionless ﬁrst-best world is
higher than the liquidation value per unit of capital l, i.e., qFB > l.10 Under this assumption, it is
suboptimal for the ﬁrm to liquidate its asset provided that the ﬁrm has cash to operate its physical
asset. To formally illustrate this point, note that liquidation at any time yields lK+W = lK+wK,
the sum of the recovery value of the ﬁrm’s asset and the ﬁrm’s total cash inventory W that can
be distributed to shareholders at no cost. As the ﬁrm can always choose to disburse its cash at
any time, the value of cash cannot be lower than W, its value when paid out to shareholders. In
addition, by deferring liquidation and holding on to its cash the ﬁrm retains a valuable option to
ﬁnance future investment opportunities and to see its earnings potentially grow, which enhances
ﬁrm value. Therefore, the optimal liquidation boundary is given by w = 0. Firm value upon
liquidation is thus p(0)K = lK, implying that
p(0) = l. (15)
We now turn to the endogenous upper payout boundary w for the cash-capital ratio w. Intu-
itively, when the cash-capital ratio is very high (w > w), the ﬁrm is better oﬀ paying out the excess
cash (w − w) to shareholders. That is, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to distribute the excess cash as
a lump-sum and bring the cash-capital ratio w down to w. Since ﬁrm value must be continuous
before and after cash distribution, p(w) is then given by
p(w) = p(w) + (w − w), w > w. (16)
Since the above equation also holds for w close to w, we may take the limit and obtain the
following condition for the endogenous upper boundary w:
p′ (w) = 1. (17)
At w the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between distributing and retaining one dollar, so that the marginal
value of cash must equal one, which is the marginal cost of cash to shareholders. Since the payout
10 Otherwise, the ﬁrm should never employ its physical production technology and instead liquidate its capital for
its higher value lK.
15boundary w is optimally chosen, we also have the following “super contact” condition (see, e.g.
Dumas (1991)):
p′′ (w) = 0. (18)
The Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman equation (13), the investment-capital ratio equation (14), and
the associated liquidation boundary (15) and payout boundary conditions (17)-(18) then jointly
characterize the ﬁrm’s value-capital ratio p(·) and optimal dynamic investment and ﬁnancing
decisions.
Case II: Optimal Reﬁnancing. When the ﬁrm’s expected productivity   is high and/or its cost
of external ﬁnancing is low, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ raising costly external ﬁnancing than liquidating
its assets when it runs out of cash. The endogenous upper boundary is determined in the same
way as in Case I. The lower boundary, however, is more interesting. First, although the ﬁrm can
choose to raise external funds at any time, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to wait until it runs out of
cash, so that w = 0. The reason is that cash within the ﬁrm earns a below-market interest rate
(r − λ) and there is a time value for the external ﬁnancing costs. As long as it has cash, the ﬁrm
can always pay for any level of investment it desires to undertake with its cash. There is thus no
role for raising equity locally in our model given that investment is not lumpy. It is always better
to defer external ﬁnancing as long as possible.11 Our argument highlights the robustness of the
pecking order between cash and external ﬁnancing. That is, the cost of hoarding cash and the costs
of raising external funds imply that there is no need to raise external funds unless the ﬁrm has to.
This is a form of pecking order between internally generated funds and outside ﬁnancing.
Second, ﬁxed costs in raising equity (φ > 0) induce the ﬁrm to raise a lump-sum mK in cash,
where m > 0 is endogenously chosen. The reason is simply that it is cheaper to raise equity in
lumps (i.e. m > 0) to economize on the ﬁxed costs.
11However, if the cost of ﬁnancing varies over time particularly when the ﬁrm potentially faces stochastic arrival of
growth options, the ﬁrm may time the market by raising cash in times when ﬁnancing is cheaper. See Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2009).
16Since ﬁrm value is continuous before and after equity issuance, p(w) satisﬁes the following
condition when the ﬁrm issues equity (at the boundary w = 0):
p(0) = p(m) − φ − (1 + γ)m. (19)
The right side represents the value-capital ratio p(m) minus both the ﬁxed and the proportional
costs of equity issuance, per unit of capital. Since m is optimally chosen, the marginal value of the
last dollar raised must equal the marginal cost of external ﬁnancing, 1+γ. This gives the following
smoothing pasting boundary condition at m:
p′(m) = 1 + γ. (20)
Thus, when it is optimal for the ﬁrm to reﬁnance rather than liquidate, the HJB equation
(13), the investment-capital ratio equation (14), the equity-issuance boundary condition (19), the
optimality condition for equity issuance (20), and the endogenous payout boundary conditions (17)-
(18) jointly characterize the ﬁrm’s dynamic investment and ﬁnancing decisions. This is the global
solution for the ﬁrm whenever p(0) > l.
4 Quantitative Analysis
We now turn to quantitative analysis of our model. For the benchmark case, we set the riskfree
rate at r = 5% and adopt the technological parameter values that Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent
(2008) suggest ﬁt the US data for the neoclassical investment model with constant returns to scale
(Hayashi, 1982). The mean and volatility of the productivity shock are   = 21% and σ = 11%,
respectively; the adjustment cost parameter is θ = 4, and the rate of depreciation is δ = 11%.
When applicable, these numbers are annualized. The implied ﬁrst-best q in the neoclassical model
is then qFB = 1.54, and the corresponding ﬁrst-best investment-capital ratio is iFB = 13.6%.
We then set the annual cash-carrying cost parameter at λ = 1.5%, the proportional ﬁnancing
cost at γ = 6% (as suggested in Suﬁ (2009)) and the ﬁxed cost of ﬁnancing at φ = 5% (consistent
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Figure 1: Case I. Liquidation. This ﬁgure plots the solution in the case when the ﬁrm has to liquidate
when it runs out of cash (w = 0). The parameters are: riskfree rate r = 5%, the mean and volatility of
increment in productivity   = 21% and σ = 11%, adjustment cost parameter θ = 4, capital depreciation
rate δ = 11%, cash-carrying cost λ = 1.5%, and liquidation value-capital ratio l = 0.9.
with the evidence of seasonal equity oﬀerings in Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). Finally, for the
liquidation value we take l = 0.9 (as suggested in Hennessy and Whited (2007)).
Case I: Liquidation. Liquidation is optimal when either the ﬁrm’s expected productivity is low
(  ≤ 15%) or when external ﬁnancing costs are very high (φ ≥ 50%). Figure 1 plots the solution
under liquidation. In Panel A, the ﬁrm’s value-capital ratio p(w) starts at l (liquidation value)
when cash balances are equal to 0, is concave in the region between 0 and the endogenous payout
boundary w = 0.32, and becomes linear (with slope 1) beyond the payout boundary (w ≥ w). In
Section 3, we have argued that the ﬁrm will never liquidate before its cash balances hit 0. Panel A
18of Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of this result, where the ﬁrm value p(w) lies above the
liquidation value l+w (both normalized by capital) for all w > 0 . In addition, the marginal value
of cash increases as the ﬁrm becomes more constrained (closer to liquidation), which is conﬁrmed
by the concavity of p(w) for w < w (i.e. p′′(w) < 0).
Panel B of Figure 1 plots the marginal value of cash p′ (w) = PW (K,W). It shows that the
value-capital ratio p(w) is concave. The external ﬁnancing constraint makes the ﬁrm hoard cash
today in order to reduce the likelihood that it will be liquidated in the future. Consider the eﬀect of
a mean-preserving spread of cash holdings on the ﬁrm’s investment policy. Intuitively, the marginal
cost from a smaller cash holding is higher than the marginal beneﬁt from a larger cash holding
because the increase in the likelihood of liquidation outweighs the beneﬁt from otherwise relaxing
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraints. Observe also that the marginal value of cash reaches a staggering
value over 25 as w approaches 0. In other words, an extra dollar of cash is worth as high as $25 to
the ﬁrm in this region, because it helps keep the ﬁrm away from costly liquidation.
Panel C plots the investment-capital ratio i(w) and illustrates under-investment due to the
extreme external ﬁnancing constraints. Optimal investment by a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm is
always lower than ﬁrst-best investment iFB = 0.14, especially when the ﬁrm’s cash inventory w is
low. Actually, when w is suﬃciently low the ﬁrm will disinvest by selling assets to raise cash and
move away from the liquidation boundary. Note that disinvestment is costly not only because the
ﬁrm is underinvesting but also because it incurs physical adjustment costs in lowering its capital
stock. For the parameter values we use, asset sales (disinvestments) are at the annual rate of over
20% of the capital stock when w is close to zero! The ﬁrm tries very hard not to be forced into
liquidation, which would permanently eliminate the ﬁrm’s future growth opportunities. Note also
that even at the payout boundary, the investment-capital ratio is only i(w) = 0.1, about 29% lower
than the ﬁrst best level iFB. Intuitively, the ﬁrm is trading oﬀ the cash-carrying costs with the
cost of underinvestment. It optimally chooses to hoard more cash and to invest more at the payout
19boundary when the cash-carrying cost λ is lower.
Next, consider the investment-cash sensitivity measured by i′(w). Observe that i(w) increases






2 > 0. (21)
Remarkably, while i(w) is monotonically increasing in w, the investment-cash sensitivity i′(w) is
not monotonic in w. Formally, the slope of i′(w) depends on the third derivative of p(w), for which
we do not have analytical results. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) have made similar observations on
the investment-cash sensitivity in a static setting.
Case II: Reﬁnancing. Consider next the more interesting case of our model when it is optimal
for the ﬁrm to reﬁnance.12 As we have argued in Section 3, the ﬁrm only uses external ﬁnancing
when necessary, that is when it runs out of cash (w = 0). Observe that at the ﬁnancing boundary
w = 0, the ﬁrm’s value-capital ratio p(w) is strictly higher than l, so that external equity ﬁnancing
is preferred to liquidation in equilibrium.
Figure 2 displays the solutions for both the setting with ﬁxed ﬁnancing costs (φ = 5%) and the
case without ﬁxed costs (φ = 0). Comparing with Case I, we ﬁnd that the endogenous payout
boundary (marked by the solid vertical line on the right) is w = 0.27 when φ = 5%, lower than the
payout boundary for the case where the ﬁrm is liquidated (w = 0.32). Not surprisingly, ﬁrms are
more willing to pay out cash when they can raise new funds in the future. The ﬁrm’s optimal return
cash-capital ratio for our parameter values is m = 0.13, and is marked by the vertical line on the
left in Panel A. Without ﬁxed cost (φ = 0), the payout boundary drops to w = 0.15, substantially
lower than the ones with the ﬁxed costs and the liquidation case. In this case, the ﬁrm’s return
cash-capital ratio is zero. In other words, the ﬁrm raises just enough funds to keep w above 0. This
is consistent with the intuition that the higher the ﬁxed cost parameter φ, the bigger the size of
12Throughout the remainder of this paper, we restrict attention to settings with parameters such that external
equity ﬁnancing is preferred to liquidation in equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Case II. Optimal reﬁnancing at w = 0. This ﬁgure plots the solution in the case of
reﬁnancing. The parameters are: riskfree rate r = 5%, the mean and volatility of increment in productivity
  = 21% and σ = 11%, adjustment cost parameter θ = 4, capital depreciation rate δ = 11%, cash-carrying
cost λ = 1.5%, proportional and ﬁxed ﬁnancing costs γ = 6%, φ = 5%.
reﬁnancing (higher return cash-capital ratio m) each time the ﬁrm raises cash.
Panel B plots the marginal value of cash p′(w), which is positive and decreasing, conﬁrming
that p(w) is strictly concave for w ≤ w. Conditional on issuing equity and having paid the ﬁxed
ﬁnancing cost, the ﬁrm optimally chooses the return cash-capital ratio m such that the marginal
value of cash p′(m) is equal to the marginal cost of issuance 1 + γ. To the left of the return cash-
capital ratio m, the marginal value of cash p′(w) lies above 1 + γ, reﬂecting the fact that the ﬁxed
cost component in raising equity increases the marginal value of cash. When the ﬁrm runs out of
cash, the marginal value of cash is around 3, much higher than 1 + γ = 1.06.
As in the previous case, the investment-capital ratio i(w) is increasing in w. Higher ﬁxed
21cost component eﬀectively increases the severity of ﬁnancing constraints, and therefore leads to
more underinvestment. This is particularly true in the region to the left of the return cash-capital
ratio m, where the investment-capital ratio i(w) drops rapidly and even involves asset sales (about
13% of total capital when w approaches 0). Note that asset sales go down quickly (i′(w) > 3)
when w is close to zero. This is because both asset sales and equity issuance are very costly. In
contrast, removing the ﬁxed ﬁnancing costs greatly alleviates the under-investment problem, and
the investment-capital ratio i(w) becomes essentially ﬂat except for very low w.
Average q, marginal q, and investment. We now turn to the model’s predictions on average
and marginal q. We take the ﬁrm’s enterprise value – the value of all the ﬁrm’s marketable claims
minus cash, P(K,W) − W – as our measure of the value of the ﬁrm’s capital stock. Average q,




= p(w) − w. (22)









Recall that in the neoclassical setting (Hayashi (1982)), average q equals marginal q. In our
model, average q diﬀers from marginal q due to the external ﬁnancing costs. An increase in the
capital stock K has two eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s enterprise value. The ﬁrst is captured by the term
(p(w)−w) and reﬂects the direct eﬀect of an increase in capital on ﬁrm value, holding w ﬁxed. This
term is equal to average q. The second term (p′(w) − 1)w reﬂects the eﬀect of external ﬁnancing
costs on ﬁrm value through w. Increasing the capital stock mechanically lowers the cash-capital
ratio w = W/K for a given cash inventory W. As a result, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing constraint becomes
tighter and ﬁrm value drops, ceteris paribus.
Figure 3 plots the average and marginal q for the liquidation case, the reﬁnancing case with no
ﬁxed costs (φ = 0) and the reﬁnancing cost with ﬁxed costs (φ = 5%). The average and marginal












case II (φ = 5%)
case II (φ = 0)
case I












case II (φ = 5%)
case II (φ = 0)
case I
Figure 3: Average q and marginal q. This ﬁgure plots the average q and marginal q from the three
special cases of the model. The parameters, when applicable, are: riskfree rate r = 5%, the mean and
volatility of increment in productivity   = 21% and σ = 11%, adjustment cost parameter θ = 4, capital
depreciation rate δ = 11%, cash-carrying cost λ = 1.5%, proportional and ﬁxed ﬁnancing costs γ = 6%,
φ = 5%.
q are below the ﬁrst best level, qFB = 1.54 in all three cases, and they become lower as external
ﬁnancing becomes more costly. The marginal value of cash p′(w) is always larger than one due
to costly external ﬁnancing. As a result, average q increases with w. Also, the concavity of p(w)
implies that marginal q increases with w. From (22) and (23), we see that p′(w) > 1 and w > 0
imply that qm(w) > qa(w), as displayed in Figure 3.
Stationary distributions of w, p(w), p′(w), i(w), average q, and marginal q. We next
investigate the stationary distributions for the key variables tied to optimal ﬁrm policies. To make
the distributions empirically relevant, we compute them under the physical probability measure.13
Figure 4 shows the distributions for the cash-capital ratio w, the value-capital ratio p(w), the
marginal value of cash p′ (w), and the investment-capital ratio i(w). Since p(w),p′(w),i(w) are all
monotonic in Case II, the densities for their stationary distributions are connected with that of w
through (the inverse of) their derivatives.
13The link between the physical and risk-adjusted measure is explained in the Appendix.
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Figure 4: Stationary distributions in the case of reﬁnancing. This ﬁgure plots the stationary
distributions of 4 variables in Case II. The parameters are: risk free rate r = 5%, the mean and volatility
of increment in productivity   = 21% and σ = 11%, adjustment cost parameter θ = 4, capital depreciation
rate δ = 11%, cash-carrying cost λ = 1.5%, proportional and ﬁxed ﬁnancing costs γ = 6%, and φ = 5%.
Strikingly, the cash holdings of a ﬁrm are relatively high most of the time, and hence the
probability mass for i(w) and p(w) is concentrated at the highest values in the relevant support of
w. The marginal value of cash p′(w) is therefore also mostly around unity. Thus, the ﬁrm’s optimal
cash management policies appear to be eﬀective at shielding it from severe ﬁnancing constraints
and underinvestment most of the time.
Table 1 reports the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis for w, i(w), p(w),
p′(w), average q (qa(w)) and marginal q (qm(w)). Not surprisingly, all these variables have skewness.
Other than the marginal value of cash p′(w), all remaining ﬁve variables have negative skewness
with medians larger than the respective means. The positive skewness for p′(w) is consistent with
24Table 1: Moments from the stationary distribution of the refinancing case
This table reports the population moments for cash-capital ratio (w), investment-capital ratio
(i(w)), marginal value of cash (p′(w)), average q (qa(w)), and marginal q (qm(w)) from the station-
ary distribution in Case II.
w i(w) p′(w) qa(w) qm(w)
mean 0.226 0.105 1.010 1.435 1.434
median 0.239 0.108 1.001 1.436 1.435
std 0.043 0.010 0.037 0.001 0.004
skewness -1.375 -7.289 15.129 -12.296 -5.011
kurtosis 4.778 86.061 416.580 253.866 40.499
the negative skewness of all the other ﬁve variables, as p′(w) is highest for low values of w due to
the concavity of p(w). Note also that all these variables have fat tails. Interestingly, the kurtosis
values for p′(w) and qa(w) are large, despite their small standard deviations and the small diﬀerence
between the mean and median values of both p′(w) and qa(w).
Existing empirical research on corporate cash inventory has mostly focused on ﬁrms’ average
holdings (the ﬁrst entry in the ﬁrst row of Table 1) and highlighted that average holdings have
increased in recent years. Our model gives a more complete picture of the dynamics of ﬁrm
capital expenditures and cash holdings. It provides predictions on the time series behavior of ﬁrm’s
investment and ﬁnancing policies, their valuation, as well as the cross-sectional distribution of cash
holdings, and the joint distribution of cash holdings, investment, Tobin’ s q, and the frequency of
external ﬁnancing.
As is apparent from Table 1, average cash holdings provide an incomplete and even misleading
picture of ﬁrms’ cash management, investment and valuation. Indeed, one observes that even
though the median and the mean of the ﬁrm’s marginal value of cash p′(w) is close to unity, with
only a standard deviation of 0.037, there is a huge kurtosis (416.5) indicating that ﬁrms are exposed
to potentially large ﬁnancing costs even if their marginal value of cash is close to unity on average.14
14These ﬁndings may help explain why Gomes (2001) ﬁnds no cash-ﬂow eﬀect in his investment regressions based
on simulated data. If under the stationary distribution most ﬁrms’ cash holdings are bunched close to the payout
25Also, despite the tight distributions for average q and i(w), the mean and median of qa(w)
are 1.44, which is about 6.5% lower than qFB = 1.54, the average q for a ﬁrm without external
ﬁnancing costs. Similarly, the mean and median of i(w) is 0.11, which is about 23% lower than
iFB = 0.14, the investment-capital ratio for a ﬁrm without external ﬁnancing costs. Therefore,
simply looking at the diﬀerence between the mean and the median or even the standard deviation
for these variables, one can end up with a misleading description of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints.
The observation that the ratio of the median to mean marginal value of cash p′(w) is close to unity,
in particular, does not imply that ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints are small. The endogeneity of ﬁrms’
cash holdings mitigates the time-varying impact of ﬁnancing costs on investment, but the eﬀects
remain large on average.
Comparative Statics We close this section with a comparative statics analysis of ﬁrm cash
holdings and investment for the following six parameters:  ,θ,r,σ,φ,λ. We divide these parameters
into two categories. The ﬁrst three ( ,θ,r) are parameters on the physical side and have direct
eﬀects on investment (see iFB in equation(7)); the rest (σ,φ,λ) only aﬀect investment and ﬁrm
value through ﬁnancing constraints. We examine the eﬀects of these parameters through their
impact on the distributions of cash holdings and investment in Figure 5 and 6.
In Figure 5, the left panels (A, C, and E) plot the cumulative stationary distributions (CDF)
of the cash holdings w, and the right panels (B, D, and F) plot the cumulative distributions of ﬁrm
investments i. As panel A highlights, when mean productivity increases (from   = 16% to   = 21%)
ﬁrms tend to hold more cash. That is, the cumulative distributions of ﬁrms for higher values of  
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate the distributions for lower values of  . This is intuitive, since the
return on investment increases with   so that the shadow value of cash increases. Still, one might
expect ﬁrms to spend their cash more quickly for higher   as the value of investment opportunities
boundary then indeed one should not ﬁnd a cash-ﬂow eﬀect on investment on average. Note also that the key variable
for investment of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms is the ﬁrm’s cash-capital ratio and not the ﬁrm’s cash-ﬂow.






























































Figure 5: Comparative statics I:  , θ, and r. This ﬁgure plots the cumulative distribution function
for the stationary distribution of cash-capital ratio (w) and investment-capital ratio (i(w)) for diﬀerent values
of the mean of productivity shocks  , investment adjustment cost θ, and interest rate r.
rises, so that the net eﬀect on ﬁrm cash holdings is ambiguous a priori. In our baseline model, the
net eﬀect on w of a higher   is positive, because investment adjustment costs induce ﬁrms to only
gradually increase their investment outlays in response to an increase in  .
The eﬀect of an increase in   on investment is highlighted in Panel B. Again, ﬁrms respond to an
increase in   by increasing investment. At   = 16% ﬁrms are disinvesting as i(w) is negative for all
ﬁrms. At   = 18% nearly all ﬁrms are making positive investments, with most ﬁrms bunched at an
investment level of roughly i(w) = 0.03. Finally, for   = 21% most ﬁrms are investing i(w) = 0.11.
The eﬀects of an increase in investment adjustment cost θ and interest rate r on cash holdings






























































Figure 6: Comparative statics II: σ, φ, and λ. This ﬁgure plots the cumulative distribution function
for the stationary distribution of cash-capital ratio (w) and investment-capital ratio (i(w)) for diﬀerent values
of the volatility of productivity shocks σ, ﬁxed costs of external ﬁnancing φ, and carry cost of cash λ.
and investment are also quite intuitive. As panel D shows, an increase in θ has a negative eﬀect
on investment. If ﬁrms invest less, one should expect their cash holdings to increase almost me-
chanically. However, this turns out not to be the case. Firms have a lower shadow value of cash
if they anticipate lower future investment outlays. Therefore they end up holding less cash, as is
illustrated in panel C. Similar comparative statics hold for increases in the risk-free rate r: with
higher interest rates ﬁrms invest less and therefore hold less cash. This is indeed the case, as is
illustrated in panels E and F.
The eﬀects of an increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of productivity shocks are shown in
28panels A and B of Figure 6, where the stationary distribution is plotted for values of σ = 11%,
σ = 14% and σ = 17%. We change σ while holding systematic volatility ﬁxed, so that the risk-
adjusted growth rate   is unaﬀected. Again, it is intuitive that ﬁrms respond to greater underlying
volatility of productivity shocks by holding more cash. Higher cash reserves, in turn, tend to raise
the average cost of investment, so that one might expect a higher σ to induce ﬁrms to scale back
investment. Similarly, an increase in external costs of ﬁnancing φ ought to induce ﬁrms to increase
their precautionary cash holdings and to scale back their capital expenditures. This is exactly
what our model predicts, as shown in panels C and D. The eﬀect of an increase in the carry cost
λ ought to be to induce ﬁrms to spend their cash more readily, by disbursing it more frequently to
shareholders or investing more aggressively. Interestingly, although cash holdings decrease with λ,
as seen in panel E, the net eﬀect on investment is negative, as panel F shows. A higher λ makes it
more expensive for ﬁrms to maintain its buﬀer-stock cash holdings and indirectly raises the cost of
investment.
Finally, one clear diﬀerence between Figure 5 and 6 is that, unlike the physical parameters,
the parameters σ,φ,λ have rather limited eﬀects on investment. This result implies that ﬁrms can
eﬀectively adjust their cash/payout/ﬁnancing policies in response to changes in ﬁnancing or cash
management costs, leaving little impact on the real side (investment).
5 Risk and Return
In this section, we investigate how the ﬁrm’s investment, ﬁnancing, and cash management policies
aﬀect the risk and return on the equity of the ﬁrm. In order to highlight the impact of ﬁnancing
constraints on the ﬁrm’s risk and returns, we adopt the benchmark asset pricing model (CAPM),
which measures the riskiness of an asset with its market beta. Let rm and σm denote the expected
return and volatility of the market portfolio, and let ρ be the correlation coeﬃcient between the
ﬁrm’s productivity process A and the returns of the market portfolio.
29Without ﬁnancial frictions (the Modigliani-Miller world), the ﬁrm implements the ﬁrst-best
investment policy. Its expected return is constant and given by the classical CAPM formula
 FB = r + βFB (rm − r), (24)






We can derive an analogous conditional CAPM expression for the instantaneous risk-adjusted
return  r(w) of a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm (that is, a ﬁrm facing external ﬁnancing costs) by
applying Ito’s lemma (see e.g. Duﬃe (2001)):








is the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm’s conditional beta, which reﬂects the ﬁrm’s exposure to both
systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
Indeed, equation (27) highlights the fact that the equity β for a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm is
monotonically decreasing with its cash-capital ratio w. The cash-capital ratio w has two eﬀects
on the conditional beta of a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm: ﬁrst, an increase in w relaxes the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing constraint and reduces underinvestment. As a result, the risk of holding the ﬁrm’s equity
is lower. Second, the ﬁrm’s asset risk is also reduced as a result of the ﬁrm holding a greater share
of its assets in cash (whose beta is zero). Both channels imply that the conditional beta β(w) and
the required rate of return  r(w) decreases with w.
This is in contrast to the constant equity beta for an unconstrained ﬁrm (given in (25)). Im-
portantly, our analysis highlights how idiosyncratic risk is priced for a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm.
Idiosyncratic risk, as much as systematic risk, exposes the ﬁrm to external ﬁnancing costs. When
30the ﬁrm faces external ﬁnancing costs, it eﬀectively behaves like a risk-averse agent that requires
compensation for exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
Interestingly, when w is suﬃciently high, the beta for a ﬁrm facing external ﬁnancing costs can
be even lower than the beta for the neoclassical ﬁrm (facing no ﬁnancing costs). This can be seen












where qa(w) = p(w) − w is the ﬁrm’s average q (the ratio of the ﬁrm’s enterprise value and its
capital stock). Although qa(w) < qFB and p′(w) > 1, the second term, w, in the denominator of
β(w) can be so large that β(w) < βFB. Thus, as ﬁrms facing external ﬁnancing costs engage in
optimal risk management by hoarding cash, the buﬀer stock of cash holdings can make them even
safer than neoclassical ﬁrms facing no ﬁnancing costs and holding no cash.
Panel A of Figure 7 plots the ﬁrm’s value-capital ratio p(w) for three diﬀerent levels of idiosyn-
cratic volatility (ξ = 5%, ξ = 15%, and ξ = 30%). The other parameter values for this calculation
are rm−rf = 6%, σm = 20%, and the systematic volatility is ﬁxed at ρσ = 8.8% (assuming ρ = 0.8
when σ = 11%). As expected, it shows that ﬁrm value is higher and the payout boundary w is
lower for lower levels of idiosyncratic volatility.
Panel B of Figure 7 plots the marginal value of cash (p′(w)) for the same three levels of idiosyn-
cratic volatility. It shows, as expected, that p′(w) is decreasing in w for each level of idiosyncratic
volatility. The ﬁgure also reveals that for high values of w, the marginal value of cash (p′(w))
is higher for higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. But, more surprisingly, for low values of w
the marginal value of cash is actually decreasing in idiosyncratic volatility. The reason is simply
that when the ﬁrm is close to ﬁnancial distress, a dollar is more valuable for a ﬁrm with lower
idiosyncratic volatility.
Panel C plots the investment-capital ratio for the three diﬀerent levels of idiosyncratic volatility.
We see again that for suﬃciently high w, investment is decreasing in idiosyncratic volatility, whereas
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Figure 7: Idiosyncratic volatility, ﬁrm value, investment, and beta. Fixing all other parame-
ters, for three diﬀerent levels of idiosyncratic volatility (5%,15%,30%), this ﬁgure plots the ﬁrm value-capital
ratio, marginal value of cash, investment-capital ratio, and the ratio of the conditional beta of a constrained
ﬁrm to that of an unconstrained ﬁrm (ﬁrst best).
for low w, it is increasing. That is, when w is low, ﬁrms with low idiosyncratic volatility engage in
more asset sales. Again, this latter result is driven by the fact that a marginal dollar has a higher
value for a ﬁrm with lower idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, such a ﬁrm will sell more assets to
replenish its cash holdings.
Panel D plots conditional betas normalized by the ﬁrst-best equity beta: β(w)/βFB. At low
levels of w, the ﬁrm’s normalized beta β(w)/βFB can approach a value as high as 4 for idiosyncratic
volatility ξ = 5%. On the other hand, β(w) is actually lower than βFB for high w. As we have ex-
plained above, this is due to the fact that a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm hoards signiﬁcant amounts
of cash, a perfectly safe asset, so that the mix of a constrained ﬁrm’s assets may actually be safer
32than the asset mix of an unconstrained ﬁrm, which does not hoard any cash. The important empir-
ical implication that follows from these observations is that a constrained ﬁrm’s equity beta cannot
be unambiguously ranked relative to the equity beta of an unconstrained ﬁrm. It all depends on the
constrained ﬁrm’s cash holdings. The inverse relation between equity returns and corporate cash
holdings has been documented by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) among others. Importantly,
our analysis points out that this inverse relation may not just be due to agency problems, as they
emphasize, but may also be driven by the changing asset risk composition of the ﬁrm.
Panel D also reveals important information about equity beta in the cross section. A constrained
ﬁrm’s equity beta is not monotonic in its underlying idiosyncratic volatility. For large cash-capital
ratio w, the equity beta is increasing in the idiosyncratic volatility. However, when the level of w is
low, ﬁrms with low idiosyncratic volatility actually have higher equity beta. The rankings of beta
are driven by the ratio p′(w)/p(w), which can be inferred from the top two panels. Finally, for a
cross-section of ﬁrms with heterogeneous production technologies and external ﬁnancing costs, it
is crucial to take account of the endogeneity of cash holdings to understand the ﬁrm’s cash holding
choices. Indeed, a ﬁrm with high external ﬁnancing costs is more likely to hold a lot of cash, but
its conditional beta (and expected return) may still be higher than for a ﬁrm with low ﬁnancing
costs. Thus, a positive relation between equity returns and corporate cash holdings in the cross
section, although inconsistent with the within-ﬁrm predictions above, may still be consistent in a
richer formulation of our model with cross-sectional ﬁrm heterogeneity.
We close this section by brieﬂy considering the implications of costly external ﬁnancing for the
internal rate of return (IRR) of an investor who seeks to purchase shares in an all-equity ﬁrm for
a ﬁxed buy-and-hold horizon T. We use the same parameter values as the beta calculation above,
except that we ﬁx the total earnings volatility to σ = 11% (the benchmark value). Starting with
a given initial value w0 and ﬁxing a holding period T, we simulate sample paths of productivity
shocks. On each path, we use the optimal decision rules to determine the dynamics of cash holdings,
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Figure 8: Conditional IRR. This ﬁgure plots the conditional internal rate of return from investing in
the ﬁrm in Case II over diﬀerent horizons at diﬀerent levels of cash-capital ratios w. These values of w
correspond to 5,25,50,75th percentile of the stationary distribution.
investment, ﬁnancing, and payout to shareholders and to compute the value of the ﬁrm at time T.
We then compute the IRR for the simulated cash ﬂows from the investment. We report the IRR
solutions in Figure 8 for investment horizon (holding period) T ranging from 0 to 30 years and
for ﬁrms with initial w ranging from the 5% lowest to the 75% highest cash-holding ﬁrms in the
population (note that a ﬁrm among the 5% lowest cash inventory holders would have a cash-capital
ratio smaller than w = 0.14). For an investor with a very short investment horizon (say, less than
a year), buying shares in an all-equity ﬁrm among the 5% lowest holders of cash may require a
return as high as 8.4%, compared to 6.7% for an otherwise identical ﬁrm among the 25% highest
holders of cash.
6 Dynamic Hedging
In addition to cash inventory management, the ﬁrm can also reduce its cash-ﬂow risk by investing
in ﬁnancial assets (an aggregate market index, options, or futures contracts) which are correlated
34with its own business risk. Consider, for example, the ﬁrm’s hedging policy using market index
futures. Let F denote the futures price. Under the risk-adjusted probability, the futures price
evolves according to:
dFt = σmFtdBt, (29)
where σm is the volatility of the market portfolio, and B is a standard Brownian motion that is
partially correlated with Zt (the Brownian motion in (2)), E [dBtdZt] = ρdt.
Let ψt denote the fraction of total cash Wt that the ﬁrm invests in the futures contract. Futures
contracts often require that the investor hold cash in a margin account, and there is typically a cost
for holding cash in this account. Let κt denote the fraction of the ﬁrm’s cash Wt held in the margin
account (0 ≤ κt ≤ 1), and let ǫ denote the unit cost on cash held in the account. We assume that
the ﬁrm’s futures position (in absolute value) cannot exceed a constant multiple π of the amount
of cash κtWt in the margin account.15 That is, we require
|ψtWt| ≤ πκtWt. (30)
As the ﬁrm can costlessly reallocate cash between the margin account and its regular interest-
bearing account at any time, the ﬁrm will optimally hold the minimum amount of cash necessary
in the margin account to minimize the incremental interest cost ǫ. Therefore, optimality implies
that the inequality (30) holds as an equality. When the ﬁrm takes a hedging position in a futures
index, its cash-capital ratio then evolves as follows:
dWt = Kt ( dAt + σdZt) − (It + Gt)dt + dHt − dUt + (r − λ)Wtdt − ǫκtWtdt + ψtσmWtdBt. (31)
Before analyzing optimal ﬁrm hedging constrained by costly margin requirements, we ﬁrst
investigate the case where there are no margin requirements for hedging.
15For simplicity, we abstract from any variation of margin requirement, so that π is constant.
356.1 Optimal hedging with no frictions
With no margin requirement (π = ∞), the ﬁrm carries all its cash in the regular interest-bearing
account and is not constrained in the size of the futures positions ψ it can take. Firm value P(K,W)
then solves the following HJB equation:
rP(K,W) = max
I,ψ









The only diﬀerence between (32) and the HJB equation (9) with no hedging is the coeﬃcient of
the volatility term (the last term on the second line), which is now aﬀected by hedging. Since ﬁrm
value P(K,W) is concave in W, so that PWW < 0, the optimal hedging position ψ is determined











Thus, controlling for size (capital K), the ﬁrm hedges more when its cash-capital ratio w is low.
Intuitively, the beneﬁt of hedging is greater when the marginal value of cash p′(w) is high. Sub-
stituting ψ∗(w) into the HJB equation (32) and exploiting homogeneity, we obtain the following
ODE for the ﬁrm’s value-capital ratio under hedging:
rp(w) = (i(w) − δ)
￿
p(w) − wp′ (w)
￿






Note that the ODE above is the same as (13) in the case without hedging except for the variance
reduction from σ2 to σ2(1 − ρ2).
In sum, the beneﬁt of frictionless hedging is to reduce the volatility of the ﬁrm’s earnings.
Reducing the volatility lowers the likelihood that the ﬁrm will need to engage in costly external
36ﬁnancing and thereby increases ﬁrm value. Through optimal hedging the ﬁrm eﬀectively removes
its systematic shocks and thus lowers the volatility of its earnings. The remaining idiosyncratic
volatility is not hedgeable and hence continues to aﬀect ﬁrm value via costly external ﬁnancing.
6.2 Optimal hedging with margin requirements
Next, we consider the more realistic setting with a margin requirement given by (30). The ﬁrm
then faces both a cost of hedging and a constraint on the size of its hedging position. As a result,
the ﬁrm’s HJB equation now takes the following form:
rP(K,W) = max
I,ψ,κ

















Equation (36) indicates that there are two candidate solutions for κ (the fraction of cash in the
margin account): one interior and one corner. If the ﬁrm has suﬃcient cash, so that its hedging
choice ψ is not constrained by its cash holding, the ﬁrm sets κ = |ψ|/π. This choice of κ minimizes
the cost of the hedging position subject to meeting the margin requirement. Otherwise, when the
ﬁrm is short of cash, it sets κ = 1, thus putting all its cash in the margin account to take the
maximum feasible hedging position: |ψ| = π.
The direction of hedging (long (ψ > 0) or short (ψ < 0)) is determined by the correlation
between the ﬁrm’s business risk and futures return. With ρ > 0, the ﬁrm will only consider taking
a short position in futures as we have shown. If ρ < 0, the ﬁrm will only consider taking a long
position. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case where ρ > 0, so that ψ < 0.
First, consider the cash region with an interior solution for ψ (where the fraction of cash allocated


























Consider next the cash region where w is small. The beneﬁt of hedging is high in this region
(p′(w) is high when w is small). The constraint κ ≤ 1 is then binding, hence ψ∗(w) = −π for
w ≤ w−, where the endogenous cutoﬀ point w− is the unique value satisfying ψ∗(w−) = −π in
(37).
Finally, when w is suﬃciently high, the ﬁrm chooses not to hedge, as the net beneﬁt of hedging
approaches zero while the cost of hedging remains bounded away from zero. More precisely, we have
ψ∗(w) = 0 for w ≥ w+, where the endogenous cutoﬀ point w+ is the unique solution of ψ∗(w+) = 0
using (37).
In summary, there are three endogenously determined regions for optimal hedging. For suf-
ﬁciently low cash (w ≤ w−), the ﬁrm engages in maximum feasible hedging (ψ(w) = −π). All
the ﬁrm’s cash is in the margin account. In the (second) interior region w− ≤ w ≤ w+, the ﬁrm
chooses its hedge ratio ψ(w) according to equation (37) and puts up just enough cash in the margin
account to meet the requirements. For high cash holdings (w ≥ w+), the ﬁrm does not engage in
any hedging to avoid the hedging costs.
We now provide quantitative analysis of the impact of hedging on the ﬁrm’s decision rules and
ﬁrm value. We choose the following parameter values: ρ = 0.8, σm = 20% (the same as in Section
5); π = 5, corresponding to 20% margin requirement; ǫ = 0.5%; the remaining parameters are those
for the baseline case in Section 4.
In Figure 9, several striking observations emerge from the comparisons of the frictionless hedg-
ing, the hedging with costly margin requirements, and the no hedging solutions.
First, Panel A makes apparent the extent to which hedging may be constrained by the margin
requirements. On the one hand, when w > w+ = 0.16, the ﬁrm chooses not to hedge at all because
the beneﬁts of hedging are smaller than the costs due to margin requirements. On the other hand,
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Figure 9: Optimal hedging. This ﬁgure plots the optimal hedging and investment policies, the ﬁrm
value-capital ratio, and the marginal value of cash for Case II with hedging (with or without margin require-
ments). In Panel A, the hedge ratio for the frictionless case is cut oﬀ at −7 for display.
it hits the maximum hedge ratio for w < w− = 0.08. Thus, just when hedging is most valuable,
the ﬁrm will be signiﬁcantly constrained in its hedging capacity. As a result, the ﬁrm eﬀectively
faces higher uncertainty under costly hedging than under frictionless hedging. It follows that the
ﬁrm chooses to postpone payouts to shareholders (the endogenous upper boundary w shifts from
0.14 to 0.18). The ﬁrm also optimally scales back its hedging position in the middle region due to
the costs of hedging.
Second, Panel B reveals the surprising result that for low cash-capital ratios, the ﬁrm may
underinvest even more when it is able to optimally hedge (whether with or without costly margin
requirements) than when it cannot hedge at all. This is surprising, as one would expect the ﬁrm’s
39underinvestment problem to be mitigated by hedging. After all, hedging reduces the ﬁrm’s earnings
volatility and thus should reduce the need for precautionary cash balances. This rough intuition
is partially correct as, indeed, the ﬁrm does invest more for suﬃciently high values of w, when it
engages in hedging.
But why should the ﬁrm invest less or disinvest more for low values of w? The reason can be
found in Panels C and D. Panel C plots p(w) under the three settings and conﬁrms the intuition
that hedging increases ﬁrm value. As expected, p(w) is highest under frictionless hedging and lowest
without hedging. However, remarkably, not only is p(w) higher with hedging, but the marginal
value of cash p′(w) is also higher, when w is low. Panel D plots the log marginal values of cash
under the three solutions. Observe that the marginal value of cash is actually higher for low values
of w, when the ﬁrm engages in hedging. With a higher marginal value of cash, it is then not
surprising that the ﬁrm sells its assets more aggressively and hedges its operation risk in order to
lower the likelihood of using costly external ﬁnancing.
How much value does hedging add to the ﬁrm? We answer this question by computing the net
present value (NPV) of optimal hedging to the ﬁrm for the case with costly margin requirements.
The NPV of hedging is deﬁned as follows. First, we compute the cost of external ﬁnancing as the
diﬀerence in Tobin’s q under the ﬁrst-best case and q under case II without hedging. Second, we
compute the loss in adjusted present value (APV), which is the diﬀerence in the Tobin’s q under
the ﬁrst-best case and q under hedging with a costly margin. Then, the diﬀerence between the
costs of external ﬁnancing and the loss in APV is simply the value created through hedging. On
average, when measured relative to Tobin’s q under hedging with a costly margin, the costs of
external ﬁnancing is about 7%, the loss in APV is about 5%, so that the NPV of costly hedging is
of the order of 2%, a signiﬁcant creation of value to say the least for a purely ﬁnancial operation.
407 Credit line
Our baseline model of Section 2 can be extended to allow the ﬁrm to draw down a credit line. This
is an important extension to consider, as many ﬁrms in practice are able to secure such lines, and
for these ﬁrms, access to a credit line is an important alternative source of liquidity than cash.16
We model the credit line as a source of funding the ﬁrm can draw on at any time it chooses up
to a limit. We set the credit limit to a maximum fraction of the ﬁrm’s capital stock, so that the
ﬁrm can borrow up to cK, where c > 0 is a constant. The logic behind this assumption is that the
ﬁrm must be able to post collateral to secure a credit line and the highest quality collateral does
not exceed the fraction c of the ﬁrm’s capital stock. We may thus interpret cK to be the ﬁrm’s
short-term debt capacity. We also assume that the ﬁrm pays a constant spread α over the risk-free
rate on the amount of credit it uses. That is, the ﬁrm pays interest on its credit at the rate r + α.
Suﬁ (2009) shows that a ﬁrm on average pays 150 basis points over LIBOR on its credit lines. This
essentially completes the description of a credit line in our model. We leave other common clauses
of credit lines-such as commitment fees and covenants-as well as the endogenous determination of
the limit cK to future research.
Since the ﬁrm pays a spread α over the risk-free rate to access credit, it will optimally avoid
using its credit line or other costly external ﬁnancing before exhausting its internal funds (cash)
to ﬁnance investment. The ﬁrm does not pay ﬁxed costs in accessing the credit line, so it also
prefers to ﬁrst draw on the line before tapping equity markets as long as the interest rate spread α
is not too high.17 Our model thus generates a pecking order among internal funds, credit lines and
external equity ﬁnancing.
As in the baseline model of Section 3, in the cash region, the ﬁrm value-capital ratio p(w)
16In future work, we plan to add to the model the availability of long-term debt ﬁnancing and study the interactions
between debt and cash.
17When α is high and equity ﬁnancing costs (φ,γ) are low, the ﬁrm may not exhaust its credit line before accessing
external equity markets. However, for our parameter values, we ﬁnd that the pecking order results apply between
the credit line and external equity.
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Figure 10: Credit line. This ﬁgure plots the model solution with credit line and external equity. Each
panel plots for two scenarios: one without credit line (c = 0) and the other with credit line (c = 20%). The
spread on the credit line is α = 1.5% over the risk-free rate r.
satisﬁes the ODE in (13), and has the same boundary conditions for payout (17-18). When credit
is the marginal source of ﬁnancing (credit region), p(w) solves the following ODE:
rp(w) = (i(w) − δ)
￿
p(w) − wp′ (w)
￿
+ ((r + α)w +   − i(w) − g(i(w))) p′ (w) +
σ2
2
p′′ (w), w < 0
(38)
When the ﬁrm exhausts its credit line before issuing equity, the boundary conditions for the timing
and the amount of equity issuance are similar to the ones given in Section 3. That is, we have
p(−c) = p(m) − φ − (1 + γ)(m + c), and p′(m) = 1 + γ. Finally, p(w) is continuous and smooth
everywhere, including at w = 0, which gives two additional boundary conditions.
Figure 10 plots p(w), the marginal value of liquidity p′(w), the investment-capital ratio i(w),
42and the investment-cash sensitivity i′(w), when the ﬁrm has access to a credit line. As can be seen
from the ﬁgure, having access to a credit line increases the ﬁrm’s value-capital ratio p(w). This
is to be expected, as access to a credit line provides a cheaper source of external ﬁnancing than
equity under our chosen parameter value for the spread on the credit line: α = 0.015. Second,
observe that with the credit line option the ﬁrm hoards signiﬁcantly less cash, and the payout
boundary w drops from 0.27 to 0.13 when the credit line increases from c = 0 to c = 20% of the
ﬁrm’s capital stock. Third, without access to a credit line (c = 0), the ﬁrm raises lumpy amounts
of equity mK (with m = 0.13 for φ = 5%) when it runs out of cash. In contrast, when c = 20%,
the ﬁrm raises 0.17K in a new equity oﬀering when it has exhausted its credit line, so as to pay oﬀ
most of the debt it has accumulated on its credit line. But, note that for our baseline parameter
choices, the ﬁrm still remains in debt after the equity issuance, as m = −0.03. Fourth, the credit
line substantially lowers the marginal value of liquidity. Without the credit line, the marginal value
of cash at w = 0 is p′(0) = 3.03, while with the credit line (c = 20%), the marginal value of cash
at w = 0 is p′(0) = 1.03, and the marginal value of cash at the point when the ﬁrm raises external
equity is p′(−c) = 2.43.
It follows that a credit line substantially mitigates the ﬁrm’s underinvestment problem as can
be seen in Panel C in Figure 10. Without a credit line (c = 0), the ﬁrm engages in signiﬁcant asset
sales (i = −13.7%) when it is about to run out of cash. With a credit line, however (c = 20%),
the ﬁrm’s investment-capital ratio is i(0) = 10.9% when it runs out of cash (w = 0). Even when
the ﬁrm has exhausted its credit line (at w = −20%), it engages in much less costly asset sales
(i(−c) = −7.5%). Finally, observe that the investment-cash sensitivity is substantially lower when
the ﬁrm has access to a credit line. For example, when the ﬁrm runs out of cash, the investment-
cash sensitivity i′(0) = 0.2, much smaller than i′(0) = 3.3 when the ﬁrm has no credit line and has
to issue external equity to ﬁnance investment.
Next, we turn to the eﬀect of liquidity (cash and credit) on marginal q and investment.
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Figure 11: Investment and q with credit line. The left panel plots the average q (qa) and marginal
q (qm) from the case with credit line (c = 0.2) and without credit line (c = 0). The right panel plots the
average q, marginal q, the ratio of marginal q to marginal value of liquidity (qm/p′) on the left axis, and
investment-capital ratio (i) on the right axis. These results are for the case with credit line (c = 0.2).
The left panel of Figure 11 plots the ﬁrm’s marginal and average q for two identical ﬁrms: one
with a credit line (c = 20%), and the other without a credit line (c = 0). Recall that:
qm(w) = qa(w) − (p′(w) − 1)w. (39)
For a ﬁrm without a credit line, marginal q lies below average q, because p′(w) > 1 for w ∈ (0,w).
The intuition is that a unit increase in capital K lowers the ﬁrm’s cash-capital ratio w = W/K,
which makes the ﬁrm more ﬁnancially constrained, thus lowering marginal q.
In contrast, when the ﬁrm has access to credit lines and is in the credit region (W < 0), marginal
q lies above average q. In this region, increasing K raises the ﬁrm’s debt capacity (credit line limit
cK) and lowers its book leverage, which relaxes the ﬁrm’s borrowing constraint, thus making the
value of marginal q higher. Formally, when w < 0, the second term in (39) is positive so that
qm > qa. Moreover, note that q′
m(w) = −p′′(w)w < 0 in the credit region. Thus, marginal q is
decreasing in w when w ≤ 0, opposite to the case when w > 0.
44Remarkably, although average q is always below the ﬁrst-best q, marginal q may exceed the
ﬁrst-best marginal q when the ﬁrm is in the credit region, as can be seen in Figure 11. Moreover,
observe that the quantitative diﬀerences between average and marginal q are much larger in the
credit region than in the cash region.
A widely held belief in the empirical literature on corporate investment is that marginal q is a
more accurate measure than average q of the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities. This is indeed true
in the Modigliani-Miller world (without ﬁxed costs of investment), but it is not generally valid in a
world where ﬁrms face ﬁnancial constraints. The right panel of Figure 11 shows that although the
investment-capital ratio i(w) increases with w in the credit region, marginal q actually decreases
with w. As a result, marginal q and investment move in opposite directions in the credit region. To
understand this seemingly counterintuitive result, we must look at the investment Euler equation
for a ﬁrm facing ﬁnancial constraints. It is clear from this equation that investment is driven by
the ratio of marginal q to the marginal value of liquidity p′(w). Now in the credit region, both the
marginal value of liquidity p′(w) and marginal q are high when the ﬁrm is close to its credit limit.
Indeed, the marginal value of liquidity p′(w) increases at a higher rate than marginal q when the
ﬁrm uses up more of its credit line (i.e. when we move to the left in the credit region), and as a
result, the investment-capital ratio falls when the ﬁrm uses more credit.
Finally, we turn to the analysis of the stationary distribution of ﬁrms, when ﬁrms have access
to a credit line. To understand the diﬀerent behavior in the cash and the credit regions, we report
the ﬁrst four moments of the distribution plus the medians of the variables of interests (w, i(w),
p′(w), qa(w), and qm(w)) for each region. The most signiﬁcant observation is that the availability
of credit makes the ﬁrm’s stationary distribution for these variables much less skewed and fat-tailed
in the cash region. Because liquidity is more abundant with a credit line, the ﬁrm’s marginal value
of cash is eﬀectively unity throughout the cash region. However, the skewness and fat-tails of the
distribution now appear in the credit region (note, for example, the high kurtosis (117) for marginal
45q in the credit region.) Although the ﬁrm has a credit line of up to 20% of its capital stock, it only
uses about 4% of its line on average. The reason is that the ﬁrm does not spend much time around
the credit line limit. The risk of facing a large ﬁxed cost of equity induces the ﬁrm to immediately
move away from its credit limit.
The cash-capital ratio w, i(w), qa(w), and qm(w) are all skewed to the left in the cash region,
as in our baseline model without a credit line. The intuition is similar to the one provided in
the baseline model. Moreover, because of the ﬁrm’s optimal buﬀer-stock cash holding, there is
eﬀectively no variation in the cash region for the ﬁrm’s investment and value. Note also that the
mean and median of marginal q and average q are all equal to 1.483, up to the third decimal point.
Even for the investment-capital ratio i(w), the diﬀerence between its median and mean values only
appear at the third decimal point.
Unlike in the cash region, not only is the marginal value of credit p′(w) skewed to the left, but
so is marginal q in the credit region. The left skewness of marginal q and p′(w) are both driven
by the fact that every so often the ﬁrm hits the credit limit and incurs large ﬁnancing costs. In
other words, there is much more variation in the credit region than in the cash region for marginal
q and the marginal value of liquidity p′(w). As marginal q and the marginal value of liquidity move
in the same direction in the credit region, there is, however, much less variation in i(w), which is
monotonically related to the ratio qm(w)/p′(w).
8 Conclusion
We have shown how in the presence of external ﬁnancing and payout costs the ﬁrm’s optimal
investment, ﬁnancing and risk management policies are all interconnected. The ﬁrm’s optimal cash
inventory policy takes the form of a double-barrier policy where the ﬁrm raises new funds only when
its cash inventory is entirely depleted, and pays out cash to shareholders only when its cash-capital
ratio hits an endogenous upper barrier. In between these two barriers, the ﬁrm continuously adjusts
46Table 2: Conditional moments from the stationary distribution of the credit line
model
This table reports the population moments for cash-capital ratio (w), investment-capital ratio
(i(w)), marginal value of cash (p′(w)), average q (qa(w)), and marginal q (qm(w)) from the station-
ary distribution in the case with credit line.
w i(w) p′(w) qa(w) qm(w)
A. credit line region
mean -0.042 0.094 1.085 1.479 1.485
median -0.032 0.100 1.060 1.480 1.482
std 0.035 0.019 0.082 0.005 0.009
skewness -1.194 -2.912 5.049 -3.926 8.754
kurtosis 4.177 14.908 43.820 25.977 116.770
B. cash region
mean 0.087 0.119 1.005 1.483 1.483
median 0.095 0.120 1.001 1.483 1.483
std 0.034 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000
skewness -0.724 -1.930 1.994 -2.540 -1.122
kurtosis 2.489 6.157 6.463 9.222 3.007
its investment to take account of positive or negative cash-ﬂow shocks. In addition the ﬁrm also
hedges its earnings risk by investing in ﬁnancial assets that are not perfectly correlated with its
underlying business risk. The beneﬁt of such hedges is to reduce the volatility of the ﬁrm’s cash
inventory.
Our model of the ﬁrm’s optimal risk management policy is both tractable and operational, to
the extent that the ﬁrm’s policy can be tied down entirely to observable parameter values, such as
the volatility and growth of earnings, the costs of external ﬁnancing and the opportunity cost of
hoarding cash. In a number of respects, though, our model is simple. It does not account for the
sudden arrival of investment opportunities or changes in the cost of external ﬁnancing. Nor does it
include other risks that ﬁrms are exposed to in practice such as litigation risk. Our model also does
not have any endogenous leverage decision. Finally, our analysis only looks at risk management
from the shareholders’ perspective. In practice, however, risk management decisions are made by
47self-interested managers. We believe that all of these features can be incorporated into our basic
model while still retaining a tractable and operational model. We leave the incorporation of these
elements into a richer model to future research.
48Appendix
Boundary conditions We begin by showing that PW (K,W) ≥ 1. The intuition is as follows.
The ﬁrm always can distribute cash to investors. Given P (K,W), paying investors ζ > 0 in cash
changes ﬁrm value from P (K,W) to P (K,W − ζ). Therefore, if the ﬁrm chooses not to distribute
cash to investors, ﬁrm value P (K,W) must satisfy
P (K,W) ≥ P (K,W − ζ) + ζ,
where the inequality describes the implication of the optimality condition. With diﬀerentiability, we
have PW (K,W) ≥ 1 in the accumulation region. In other words, the marginal beneﬁt of retaining
cash within the ﬁrm must be at least unity due to costly external ﬁnancing. Let W(K) denote the






The above argument implies the following payout policy:
dUt = max{Wt − W (Kt),0},
where W(K) is the endogenously determined payout boundary. Note that paying cash to investors
reduces cash holding W and involves a linear cost. The following standard condition, known as
super contact condition, characterizes the endogenous upper cash payout boundary (see e.g. Dumas,
1991 or Dixit, 1993):
PWW(K,W(K)) = 0. (41)
When the ﬁrm’s cash balance is suﬃciently low (W ≤ W), under-investment becomes too costly.
The ﬁrm may thus rationally increase its internal funds to the amount W by raising total amount
of external funds (1 + γ)(W − W). Optimality implies that
P(K,W) = P(K,W) − (1 + γ)(W − W), W ≤ W. (42)
49Taking the limit by letting W → W in (42), we have
PW(K,W(K)) = 1 + γ. (43)
Risk-neutral probability Assuming market completeness, the linkage between the physical
measure P and the risk-adjusted measure Q is determined by the stochastic discount factor Λt (see
e.g. Duﬃe (2001)). For simplicity, we assume that the CAPM holds, so that Λt follows
dΛt
Λt
= −rdt − ηd b Bt,
where b Bt is a standard Brownian motion under P and is the source of shocks to market returns,
and η is the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Then, Bt is a standard Brownian motion under
Q satisfying dBt = d b Bt + ηdt. We calibrate the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio η = 0.3, and
assume that the correlation between the technology shocks Zt and market returns is ρ = 0.8.
The stationary distributions of cash-capital ratio w in this paper are computed under the
physical measure. The dynamics of w under P is
dwt = ((r − λ)wt +   + ρησ − i(w) − g(i(w))) dt + σdb Zt, (44)
where b Zt is a standard Brownian motion under P.
Numerical Procedure We use the following procedure to solve the free boundary problem
speciﬁed by ODE (13) and the boundary conditions associated with the diﬀerent cases. First,
we postulate the value of the free (upper) boundary ¯ w, and solve the corresponding initial value
problem using the Runge-Kutta method. For each value of ¯ w we can compute the value of p(w)
over the interval [0, ¯ w]. We can then search for the ¯ w that will satisfy the boundary condition
for p at w = 0. In the cases with additional free boundaries, including Case III and the model
of hedging with margin requirements, we search for ¯ w jointly with the other free boundaries by
imposing additional conditions at the free boundaries.
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